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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 30,
.c)

the Public Service Commission

q1anted an application by Utah Power & Light Company

, .. ~,l~L"
,, 0

1982,

or the "Company"),

allowing it to adjust its Energy

lcJnring Account ("EBA") for the period September 1981,

·~1ough

August, 1982 (the "Relevant Period"), by transferring

012,000 (representing approximately one-third of UP&L's
:~venues

from non-tariff sales during 1981) from the EBA to its

"cneral account.

1

The PSC Order was reversed by the Utah

"11preme Court on May 22, 1986.
RELIEF SOUGHT
By this Petition, UP&L seeks a rehearing of these
~dses

and the decision of the Court:

'he PSC; or (2)

(1)

affirming the Order of

remanding these cases to the PSC for additional

:1ndings of fact and conclusions of law.

In Re Application of Utah Power & Light Co., No.
slip op. (P.S.C. Utah Dec. 30, 1982), aff'd on
reheJrin_g, No. 82-035-14, slip op. (P.S.C. Utah July 5, 1983),
r~•·"d, LJta_h_~artment of Business Regulation v. Public Service
, nUT:i!>;;iQn, Nos. 19361 and 19362, slip op. {Utah May 22,
'lib).
The PSC Order dated December 30, 1982, and the PSC
·•2r on Rehearing dated July 5, 1983, are collectively
·~'~rred to herein as the "PSC Order".
The Court's Opinion of
Y 22, 1986, is referred to herein as the "Opinion".
1

32-03~-14,

1

0

STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OV&R~OQKEQ
OR MiSAPPREHENDED BY_IHE COURT
UP&L claims that the Court's decision overlooks or
misapprehends the following points of law or fact:
I.

II.

III.

THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED UP&L'S ARGUMENT THAT
THE PSC ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE
RETROACTIVE RATEMAKING.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILS TO
CONSIDER THE PSC ORDER IN IN RE APPLICATION_QJ:'
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, slip op. (P.S.C.
Utah Aug. 2, 1982).
IF THE COURT CANNOT AFFIRM THE PSC ORDER BECAUSE
OF INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW CONCERNING THE EBA, IT SHOULD REMAND THESE
CASES FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO BE MADE BY THE PSC.
ARGUMENT

A petition for rehearing is proper and should be
granted where the court, in its original opinion, misapprehends
or overlooks points of law or fact or where the findings and
conclusions of the court, board or commission below are
inadequate or unclear (thereby raising, in each instance,
questions as to whether a correct result was or could be
reached) or where it is necessary to correct an injustice in
the original opinion.

~,

~.

Kirchgestner v. Denver

&

R.G.W.R. Co., 118 Utah 37, 225 P.2d 754 (1950); Rule 35, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure; 5 C.J.S. Appeals & Errors § 1411.
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POINT I
THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED UP&L'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
PSC ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE RETROACTIVE
RATEMAKING.
A.
The Court's Decision Erroneously Characterizes as
pr_Qhib ti'Q_ "Retroactive Ratemaking" An Accounting Adjustment
''~~i_g11 gL _A_;; the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking is
~esig11 dL To Encourage Efficiency.
"Before there can be retroactive ratemaking there must
3t

least be ratemaking."

~'Lt;i_lic

Southern California Edison Co. v.

Utility Commission, 20 Cal. 3d 813, 576 P.2d 945, 144

al. Reptr. 905 ( 1978).

0

In its Order on Rehearing dated July 5, 1983, the PSC
staled,

~~ter

alia, that "the proposed adjustment is consistent

'ith Commission intent that the EBA eliminate inequitable
rPsults or windfall benefits to either the Company or its
ratepayers" and that the "proposed adjustment is consistent
with other adjustments previously and currently made in the

'Fnergy Balancing] Account procedure in that all are
retruactive in nature and none alter the Commission approved
<•te."

Order on Rehearing No. 82-035-14 (P.S.C. Utah July 5,

lJ83).

The Court's decision overlooks the rationale behind
'

1

·"

rule against retroactive ratemaking and erroneously

'"'"~terizes

as prohibited "retroactive ratemaking" an

counting adjustment designed and intended to avoid the same
-3-

t

hi11g the rule i tsc·lf srcks tn avoiJ.

the general

prnhi~ition

As the court recogni z•

against retroactive ratemaking is

intenJed "to provide utilities with some incentive to operate
efficiently

Qpi_J}i_g_IJ at 2.

The PSC Order al lowing the

accounting adjustment in this case is consistent with this
underlying policy because it encourages efficiency by
protecting UP&L from being penalized for aggressively marketina
excess energy production tc non-tariff users in an unusual
situation of

ab~ormally

high reduced demand by tariff

ratepayers where its generating capacity would otherwise remain
idle.
The Court misconstrued UP&L's argument that the
a-counting adjustment effected by the PSC Order was not
'. rna<tive ratemaking.

The Court failed to note the

difference between a change in the general rate charged tariff
customers and the type of accounting adjustment allowed by the
PSC Order.

UP&L

suu~ht

one-time relief from the penalty

imposed by the EBA system because of its unexpectedly high
nnn-tariff sales and did not seek an increase in the general
rates charged tariff customers.
Without the modification made by the PSC's Order, thP
EBA system provides

A

disincentive to make non-tariff sales.

By applying the enti1e amrunl of all non-tariff revenues
(instead of only that portion of those revenues which is equal
to the energy costs of producing those revenues) as a general
-4-

1 ,

rt

against energy costs, the EBA system produces an

'i•''"'i'.' penalty to the utility which attempts to keep costly

, 11ties in use in times of reduced demand by tariff
,. , payers.

By stopping or reducing production from its

'Jc1lities during such times, UP&L could reduce operating costs
.cd net revenue losses.

The EBA system, as applied without the

1dit1cation made in the PSC Order, penalizes the utility which
-~eps

its facilities in operation and aggressively sells the

'XCess capacity to non-tariff ratepayers.
.~

UP&L submits that it

anomalous, in the name of protecting against inefficiency,

ta strike down a procedure which protects against inefficiency.
The accounting adjustment proposed by UP&L is
analogous to the accounting adjustment ordered by the
California Public Utility Commission in Southern California
tlis911

Co~,

576 P.2d 945, cited in the Opinion.

In each case

:here was an unusual one-time surfeit of funds in the energy
calancing account.
1 1 uup

In each case, absent some adjustment, one

either ratepayer or shareholder, would be unfairly

~nalized.

2

In Southern California Edison the Court

2 In Southern California Edison, the adjustment was
'essitated by excess revenues in the fuel adjustment account
« 1 s··rl by a change in tax accounting procedure that resulted in
" time, significant profits to the company. The Supreme
' 1 11
of California allowed a one-time accounting modification
pass some of the benefit on to ratepayers.

-5-

determined that such a one-time accounting modification was
merely an equitable adjustment and did not constitute
retroactive ratemaking.
In the Opinion, the Court noted its assumption "that
the EBA order was promulgated under the Commission's ample
general power to fix rates and establish accounting
procedures.•

Opinion at 6, n. 4.

The Court described the EBA

as
a rather unique device for handling not only the
utilities' unstable fuel costs, but also other cost
and revenue items which the PSC felt were subject to
rapid and unpredictable fluctuation.
Opinion at 3.

The Court further noted that

ideally, over the long term, the account is
zeroed out, ~. the revenues flowing into
the account will equal the expenditures
charged to it. Thus, the EBA accomplishes
the purpose of the pass-through legislation
to allow expeditious rate response to those
elements of cost which are subject to
frequent fluctuation, and it does so without
bypassing the more formal requirements of
general rate making.
Opinion at 4.

If the EBA is recognized as principally an

accounting device of the PSC to implement general pass-through
legislation, it follows that the PSC should be able to
authorize changes in the accounting procedure to allow that
procedure to more accurately reflect proper allocations of

-6-

rgy costs.
J

The Commission must have the continuing power

responsibility to administer and improve the EBA system.

·L the time the EBA was created,

the PSC contemplated that

adjustments would need to be made periodically to

o~counting

correct inaccuracies in the accounting procedures.
1<..QQlii;;9tion

of Utah Power & Light Co., Nos. 78-035-21 and

"9-035-03, slip op.
f~rtherance

See, In Re

at 16 (P.S.C. Utah July 20, 1979).

In

of this continuing power and responsibility, the

fSC has, in the PSC Order and in the Mountain Fuel case, supra,
encouraged and directed these parties, the Division of Public
Utilities and "other interested parties" to consider the
solutions to the inequitable results which occur in the EBA.
PSI Order, No.

82-035-14

)P.S.C. Utah Dec. 30, 1982); Mountain

fuel case, .s..u.?..Li!.. at 6.
Since the EBA is intended to be "zeroed out" on a
periodic basis, it is essentially an account balancing
mechanism designed to achieve equitable adjustments and the
tair and equitable exercise by the Commission of its general
1

'owers on a continuing basis.

Under the Court's decision this

Purpose is frustrated by a rigid and inviolate application of
thP
1

rule against "retroactive ratemaking."

UP&L submits that

te C0urt's decision effectively emasculates the EBA system and

··c~ludes

it from being fairly administered.

-7-

B.
Even if the Court Does Deem the Modifica~ions t
the EBA Account to be Retroactive Ratemaking,_J,JP&L Believes
that the Court Should have Allowed An Exception to the Generel
Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking.
The prohibition against retroactive ratemaking is not
absolute.

"The spectre of retroactive ratemaking must not be

viewed as a talismatic inhibition against the application of
principles based upon equity and common sense."
Narragansett Electric Co., #82-156-M.P.,
Jan 11, 1984).

~-

Roberts v.
Ql).

at 5 (R.I.,

The court in its Opinion recognized the

possibility of exceptions, at least implicitly, when it stated
the rule that utilities "are generally not permitted to adjust
their rates retroactively to compensate for unanticipated costs
or unrealized revenues."

Opinion at 2 (emphasis added).

The

key factor in determining whether to apply the rule against
retroactive ratemaking should be whether application of the
rule will further the public policy rationales underlying the
rule, or will ultimately frustrate those rationales.
The real fear behind retroactive ratemaking is that
"if a utility's income were guaranteed, the company would lose
all incentive to operate in an efficient, cost-effective
manner, thereby leading to higher operating costs and eventual
rate increases."

177, (R.I. 1980).

Narragansett Electric Co. v, Burke, 415 A.2d
It is that public policy of stimulating

efficiency that should guide the court in determining whether
to apply the rule prohibiting retroactive ratemaking.

-8-

A great many states have recognized that utilities
•

he allowed retroactive rate increases to offset the

111~

r!c ·ts of unusual circumstances such as freak winter storms.
e.g., !iQ_LLQ_g_ansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177,

5~~.
\~.I.

1980) (citing cases from Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,

~ansas,

Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New

-1sey, New York and Pennsylvania.)

The one-time accounting

2d1uslment sought by UP&L is prompted by an analogous unusual
:1ccumstance.

In each of these cases:

the change in revenue

-, expenses was a result of an unforeseen and unforeseeable
·1rcumstance; the utility did its best to mitigate the negative
effects of the situation and to operate as efficiently as
possible; and the purpose of the accounting adjustment was to
spread the risk associated with the incident fairly between the
shareholders and the ratepayers.
Application of the rule against retroactive ratemaking
1

n this case does not further any of the public policies behind

Lhe general rule.
a~a1nst

A rigid application of the general rule

retroactive ratemaking in this case situation will

iiscourage attempts to market excess generation capacity and
actually defeat the purpose of the rule.

This reality is

llustrated by the following statement of the court in
1agan~gU;:

-9-

The next time a storm of this magnitude
occurs, the company would have no incentive
to hire outside line and tree crews to
restore service efficiently and swiftly to
customers if no reimbursement for
extraordinary expenses would be
forthcoming. Thus, dpplication of the rule
to expenses related to such an emergency
situation so inexorably related to the
public health and safety would serve to
thwart the goal of efficient customer
service.
~<iqansett

Electric Co.

-,~Burke,

415 A.2d at 179.

This

Court should recognize an exception to the general rule against
retroactive ratemaking in extraordinary situations such as

th~

one presented in the present case.
The Court's holding that the rule against retroactive
ratemdking precludes the adjustment to the EBA allowed by the
PSC Order fails to recognize that the effect of the EBA system
and

t'iP

'~"'rt·

s ruling in this case is to retroactively reduce

the rates to the ratepayers by the entire amount of UP&L's
non-tariff revenues during the Relevant Period (less the amount
thereof allocated to defray energy costs).

Thus, it is not a

question of whether or not "retroactive ratemaking" has or

h~s

not occurred but whether or not UP&L is to be penalized for its
ctforts to earn nrn-tariff revenues from which the ratepayers
can be benefited.

Had UP&L not utilized its facilities to meke

non-tariff sales lhere would have been no resulting benefit
available to the ratepayers.

Fairness requires that UP&L

be penalized for its effort to avoid this result.
-10-

n0t

POINT I I
'IHE DECISION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILS TO
CONSIDER THE PSC ORDER IN IN RE THE APPLICATION OF
MOUNJAl_N FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, No. 81-057-19 slip op.
(P.S.C. Utah Aug. 2, 1982).
In its original opinion, the Court stated:
Neither the facts nor the opinion in

Ap~lication of Mountain Fuel Supply to
Ad~t the Base Rate for Natural Gas

Services in Utah, Case No. 81-057-19, cited
by the PSC as precedent for this action, are
in the record, and that case apparently was
not appealed to this Court. Therefore, we
are unable to determine if there were
similar circumstances or if, in fact, an
identical diversion of funds was allowed.

~1 ~'~_1i_on

at 5, n.3.

The Mountain Fuel case should have been considered by
the

Court because it is essentially identical to the present

-•se on its facts and is an important precedent and statement
,f

the policy of the PSC in administering the EBA system.
~nt_J1_T1

In

_fuel as in this case, the PSC allowed non-tariff

:.enues which were credited to an energy balancing account
:~:untain

Fuel Supply Account No. 191), to be transferred to

.'s general revenue accounts.

As in the present case, Mountain

.,., had suffered significant losses from reductions in demand
te11ff ratepayers during the early 1980s.
1

1

1

Because of those

«•:,s, it also made efforts to generate significant
r1ff sales revenues (i.e., revenues from various
-11-

transportation arrangements,
liquid hydrocarbons).

sales for

resale,

and the sale

It also sought to have the EBA

procedures modified to allow a portion of these non-tariff
revenues to be transferred to its general revenue account.

Ic

approving the stipulation between the Division and Mountain
Fuel allowing this adjustment,

the PSC noted that in a previous

Mountain Fuel Supply matter (Case No.

80-057-10),

it had

specifically authorized Mountain Fuel to:
petition this commission for exceptions to
balancing account treatment for "other
revenues," if in the company's opinion other
treatment is warranted.
Such requests will
be considered on a case by case basis and
will take into account financial stability
of the company.
Mou n_Lij n _E_utl ,

at

5.

Fairness and consistency in administering the EBA
system requires that UP&L be allowed the same kind of
adjustment in its EBA with respect to the unusually high
non-tariff revenues received by it during the unusual
circumstances which existed during the Relevant Period as
Mountain Fuel was allowed under similar circumstances during
essentially the same period.
Mountain

F~

The Court should consider the

case as an additional reason for treating the PSC

Order as something other than "retroactive ratemaking" or as ar
exception to the general rule against retroactive ratemaking.

-12-

The Mountain Fuel case was referred to in several
3
es in the record on appeal and in oral argument.

.--J·

UP&L

, ,ic,<>nably believed that the Mountain Fuel case was properly
b~lure

the Court and was not aware until the opinion was issued

that thP Court did not consider this case to be part of the

~cord.

4

Whether or not it was physically included in the

-vrd, the Court can and should take judicial notice of it as
.1

did with other court and agency decisions which were

,~ferred

~cord.

'973).
of

to in the briefs but not physically included in in the
2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 39.02 (4th Ed.
As a convenience to the Court, UP&L has attached a copy

Lhe MoJ!!ltain Fuel case to this Petition as Appendix A.

3 Brief of Intervenor Utah Power & Light Co. at 4,
JJJillsi_rtment of Business Regulation v. Public Services
C;irnrnissiQD, Nos. 19361 & 19362, slip op. (Utah 1986); In Re
!Wfllti::i'!tion of Utah Power & Light Co., No. 82-035-14, slip op.
at 3 (P.S.C. Utah December 30, 1982) (mentioning the Mountain
~c~l case in its findings of fact); In Re Application of Utah
i~weL_kLight Co., No. 82-035-14, slip op. at 4 (P.S.C. Utah
frecember 30, 1982) (mentioning the Mountain Fuel case in its
.·onclusions).
1

ta_l!

4 UP&L has been unable to obtain a copy of the
''rJex of the record on appeal before the Court. The clerk has
0
1c1sed it that the Court cannot locate its copy, nor does the
' 11 1 ir Service Commission, the Attorney General's office, or
U~partment of Business Regulation, Division of Public
1ties have a copy.
1

-13-

IF THE COURT CANNOT
INADEQUATE FINDINGS
CONCERNING THE EBA,
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
BE MADE BY THE PSC.

AFFIRM THE PSC ORDER BECAUSE OF
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
IT SHOULD REMAND THESE CASES FOR
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO

UP&L urges the Court in this Petition to affirm the
PSC Order and preserve the equitable balancing effect and
application of the EBA system.

Alternatively, in the event the

Court feels that the PSC Order does not contain sufficient
findings and conclusions about the EBA for the Court to
entirely affirm the PSC Order, UP&L urges the Court to remand
these cases to the PSC with direction to make such findings and
conclusions.
The threshold question in an administrative
appeal is whether the record is adequate to
permit meaningful judicial review.
If it is
not, and the basis of an administrative
decision is unclear, it may be necessary to
remand the case for preparation of a record
revealing the agency's reasoning process.
Only by focusing on the relationship between
evidence and findings, and between findings
and ultimate action, can we determine
whether the agency's action is supported by
substantial evidence.
White v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 678 P.2d
1319, 1322 (Alaska 1984) (citations omitted).

The court may

raise the question of the adequacy of findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the administrative agency on its own

-14-

2 ~ugn1zance even if the issue is not properly raised by the

,

ort1cs on appeal.

Id. at 1322.

The issues raised in this case are of great importance
-0

the PSC, the utilities and the ratepayers.

It is critical

tnat the PSC be given a chance to fully explain its reasoning
1~fore

The

the Supreme Court makes a final decision on the matter.

ratepayers, and the utilities, are entitled to an appellate

1ecision based on an adequate and comprehensive set of findings
~f

fact and conclusions of law by the PSC.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, UP&L respectfully requests

fhat this Petition for Rehearing be granted.
DATED this 19th day of June, 1986.

By·~4.J,~~~~:£f.-~/.::t=~~=-!--+-~~

Ro
ld
. Ocke
Attorneys for
Defendant Uta
Light Company
170 South Main Street
Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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The undersigned counsel for Petitioner-Intervenor,
Ulah Power & Light Company, hereby certifies that the

foregoin~

Petition for Rehearing is brought in good faith and not for
delay.

By~--ff-~-~~~~~~--1-~~~~~;---~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing
Petition for Rehearing of Intervenor-Defendant Utah Power &
light Company were served by hand delivery on this 19th day of
June,

1986, upon each of the following:
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN,
Chief Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL GINSBERG
Assistant Attorney General
Tax and Business Regulation Division
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Department of Business Regulation,
Division of Public Utilities
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
SANDY MOOY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
Committee of Consumer Services
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Public Service Commission of Utah
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas W. Forsgren
Attorney for Intervenor-Defendant
Utah Power & Light Company
1407 w. North Temple
Salt Lake C i t y , 7 t a84
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